Is Learning Effective in Dynamic Strategic Interactions? Evidence from Stackelberg Games

22 April 2025

Papers citing "Is Learning Effective in Dynamic Strategic Interactions? Evidence from Stackelberg Games"

3 / 3 papers shown

Title
Calibrated Stackelberg Games: Learning Optimal Commitments Against Calibrated Agents Nika Haghtalab Chara Podimata Kunhe Yang 48 24 0 05 Jun 2023
Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents Nika Haghtalab Thodoris Lykouris Sloan Nietert Alexander Wei 81 32 0 19 Aug 2022
Learning Prices for Repeated Auctions with Strategic Buyers Kareem Amin Afshin Rostamizadeh Umar Syed 60 151 0 26 Nov 2013