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Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games

11 June 2020
Georgios Birmpas
Jiarui Gan
Alexandros Hollender
Francisco Javier Marmolejo-Cossío
Ninad Rajgopal
Alexandros A. Voudouris
    FedML
ArXiv (abs)PDFHTML

Papers citing "Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games"

6 / 6 papers shown
Title
Learning to Control Unknown Strongly Monotone Games
Learning to Control Unknown Strongly Monotone Games
Siddharth Chandak
Ilai Bistritz
Nicholas Bambos
111
3
0
30 Jun 2024
Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Information Asymmetry
Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Information Asymmetry
Tao Li
Quanyan Zhu
60
6
0
22 Dec 2022
A Survey of Decision Making in Adversarial Games
A Survey of Decision Making in Adversarial Games
Xiuxian Li
Min Meng
Yiguang Hong
Jie-bin Chen
AAML
92
14
0
16 Jul 2022
Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-form
  Games
Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-form Games
Yurong Chen
Xiaotie Deng
Yuhao Li
64
3
0
27 Jun 2022
How and Why to Manipulate Your Own Agent: On the Incentives of Users of
  Learning Agents
How and Why to Manipulate Your Own Agent: On the Incentives of Users of Learning Agents
Y. Kolumbus
N. Nisan
62
22
0
14 Dec 2021
Auctions Between Regret-Minimizing Agents
Auctions Between Regret-Minimizing Agents
Y. Kolumbus
N. Nisan
113
40
0
22 Oct 2021
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