While certified robustness is widely promoted as a solution to adversarial examples in Artificial Intelligence systems, significant challenges remain before these techniques can be meaningfully deployed in real-world applications. We identify critical gaps in current research, including the paradox of detection without distinction, the lack of clear criteria for practitioners to evaluate certification schemes, and the potential security risks arising from users' expectations surrounding ``guaranteed" robustness claims. This position paper is a call to arms for the certification research community, proposing concrete steps to address these fundamental challenges and advance the field toward practical applicability.
View on arXiv@article{cullen2025_2506.13024,
title={ Position: Certified Robustness Does Not (Yet) Imply Model Security },
author={ Andrew C. Cullen and Paul Montague and Sarah M. Erfani and Benjamin I.P. Rubinstein },
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.13024},
year={ 2025 }
}