Safeguarding Privacy of Retrieval Data against Membership Inference Attacks: Is This Query Too Close to Home?

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mitigates the hallucination problem in large language models (LLMs) and has proven effective for specific, personalized applications. However, passing private retrieved documents directly to LLMs introduces vulnerability to membership inference attacks (MIAs), which try to determine whether the target datum exists in the private external database or not. Based on the insight that MIA queries typically exhibit high similarity to only one target document, we introduce Mirabel, a similarity-based MIA detection framework designed for the RAG system. With the proposed Mirabel, we show that simple detect-and-hide strategies can successfully obfuscate attackers, maintain data utility, and remain system-agnostic. We experimentally prove its detection and defense against various state-of-the-art MIA methods and its adaptability to existing private RAG systems.

@article{choi2025_2505.22061,
  title={ Safeguarding Privacy of Retrieval Data against Membership Inference Attacks: Is This Query Too Close to Home? },
  author={ Yujin Choi and Youngjoo Park and Junyoung Byun and Jaewook Lee and Jinseong Park },
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.22061},
  year={ 2025 }
}