DaringFed: A Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion Pricing for Online Federated Learning under Two-sided Incomplete Information

Online Federated Learning (OFL) is a real-time learning paradigm that sequentially executes parameter aggregation immediately for each random arriving client. To motivate clients to participate in OFL, it is crucial to offer appropriate incentives to offset the training resource consumption. However, the design of incentive mechanisms in OFL is constrained by the dynamic variability of Two-sided Incomplete Information (TII) concerning resources, where the server is unaware of the clients' dynamically changing computational resources, while clients lack knowledge of the real-time communication resources allocated by the server. To incentivize clients to participate in training by offering dynamic rewards to each arriving client, we design a novel Dynamic Bayesian persuasion pricing for online Federated learning (DaringFed) under TII. Specifically, we begin by formulating the interaction between the server and clients as a dynamic signaling and pricing allocation problem within a Bayesian persuasion game, and then demonstrate the existence of a unique Bayesian persuasion Nash equilibrium. By deriving the optimal design of DaringFed under one-sided incomplete information, we further analyze the approximate optimal design of DaringFed with a specific bound under TII. Finally, extensive evaluation conducted on real datasets demonstrate that DaringFed optimizes accuracy and converges speed by 16.99%, while experiments with synthetic datasets validate the convergence of estimate unknown values and the effectiveness of DaringFed in improving the server's utility by up to 12.6%.

@article{xin2025_2505.05842,
  title={ DaringFed: A Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion Pricing for Online Federated Learning under Two-sided Incomplete Information },
  author={ Yun Xin and Jianfeng Lu and Shuqin Cao and Gang Li and Haozhao Wang and Guanghui Wen },
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.05842},
  year={ 2025 }
}