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Approximating One-Sided and Two-Sided Nash Social Welfare With Capacities

Abstract

We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group of agents (commonly studied in fair division). The second model deals with two-sided preferences, where a set of workers and firms, each having numerical valuations for the other side, are matched with each other (commonly studied in matching-under-preferences literature). We study these models under capacity constraints, which restrict the number of items (respectively, workers) that an agent (respectively, a firm) can receive.We develop constant-factor approximation algorithms for both problems under a broad class of valuations. Specifically, our main results are the following: (a) For any ϵ>0\epsilon > 0, a (6+ϵ)(6+\epsilon)-approximation algorithm for the one-sided problem when agents have submodular valuations, and (b) a 1.331.33-approximation algorithm for the two-sided problem when the firms have subadditive valuations. The former result provides the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for Nash welfare in the one-sided problem with submodular valuations and capacities, while the latter result improves upon an existing OPT\sqrt{OPT}-approximation algorithm for additive valuations. Our result for the two-sided setting also establishes a computational separation between the Nash and utilitarian welfare objectives. We also complement our algorithms with hardness-of-approximation results. Additionally, for the case of additive valuations, we modify the configuration LP of Feng and Li [ICALP 2024] to obtain an (e1/e+ϵ)(e^{1/e}+\epsilon)- approximation algorithm for weighted two-sided Nash social welfare under capacity constraints.

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@article{gokhale2025_2411.14007,
  title={ Approximating One-Sided and Two-Sided Nash Social Welfare With Capacities },
  author={ Salil Gokhale and Harshul Sagar and Rohit Vaish and Vignesh Viswanathan and Jatin Yadav },
  journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.14007},
  year={ 2025 }
}
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