Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) resemble early online
communities, particularly those centered around open-source projects, and
present a potential empirical framework for complex social-computing systems by
encoding governance rules within "smart contracts" on the blockchain. A key
function of a DAO is collective decision-making, typically carried out through
a series of proposals where members vote on organizational events using
governance tokens, signifying relative influence within the DAO. In just a few
years, the deployment of DAOs surged with a total treasury of 24.5billionand11.1Mgovernancetokenholderscollectivelymanagingdecisionsacrossover13,000DAOsasof2024.Inthisstudy,weexaminetheoperationaldynamicsof100DAOs,likepleasrdao,lexdao,lootdao,optimismcollective,uniswap,etc.Withlarge−scaleempiricalanalysisofadiversesetofDAOcategoriesandsmartcontractsandbyleveragingon−chain(e.g.,votingresults)andoff−chaindata,weexaminefactorssuchasvotingpower,participation,andDAOcharacteristicsdictatingthelevelofdecentralization,thus,theefficiencyofmanagementstructures.Assuch,ourstudyhighlightsthatincreasedgrassrootsparticipationcorrelateswithhigherdecentralizationinaDAO,andlowervarianceinvotingpowerwithinaDAOcorrelateswithahigherlevelofdecentralization,asconsistentlymeasuredbyGinimetrics.Theseinsightscloselyalignwithkeytopicsinpoliticalscience,suchastheallocationofpowerindecision−makingandtheeffectsofvariousgovernancemodels.Weconcludebydiscussingtheimplicationsforresearchers,andpractitioners,emphasizinghowthesefactorscaninformthedesignofdemocraticgovernancesystemsinemergingapplicationsthatrequireactiveengagementfromstakeholdersindecision−making.