In order to mitigate the distance reduction attack in Ultra-Wide Band (UWB) ranging, this paper proposes a secure ranging scheme based on a random time-hopping mechanism without redundant signaling overhead. Additionally, a secure ranging strategy is designed for backward compatibility with existing standards such as IEEE 802.15.4a/z, combined with an attack detection scheme. The effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed strategy are demonstrated through both simulation and experimental results in the case of the Ghost Peak attack, as demonstrated by Patrick Leu et al. The random time-hopping mechanism is verified to be capable of reducing the success rate of distance reduction attacks to less than 0.01%, thereby significantly enhancing the security of UWB ranging.
View on arXiv@article{gou2025_2406.06252,
title={ Resilient Random Time-hopping Reply against Distance Attacks in UWB Ranging },
author={ Wenlong Gou and Chuanhang Yu and Gang Wu },
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.06252},
year={ 2025 }
}