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Adapting to game trees in zero-sum imperfect information games

Abstract

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn ϵ\epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound O~(H(AX+BY)/ϵ2)\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(H(A_{\mathcal{X}}+B_{\mathcal{Y}})/\epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where HH is the length of the game, AXA_{\mathcal{X}} and BYB_{\mathcal{Y}} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs O~(H2(AX+BY)/ϵ2)\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(H^2(A_{\mathcal{X}}+B_{\mathcal{Y}})/\epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

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