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Greedy Adversarial Equilibrium: An Efficient Alternative to Nonconvex-Nonconcave Min-Max Optimization

22 June 2020
Oren Mangoubi
Nisheeth K. Vishnoi
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Abstract

Min-max optimization of an objective function f:Rd×Rd→Rf: \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}f:Rd×Rd→R is an important model for robustness in an adversarial setting, with applications to many areas including optimization, economics, and deep learning. In many applications fff may be nonconvex-nonconcave, and finding a global min-max point may be computationally intractable. There is a long line of work that seeks computationally tractable algorithms for alternatives to the min-max optimization model. However, many of the alternative models have solution points which are only guaranteed to exist under strong assumptions on fff, such as convexity, monotonicity, or special properties of the starting point. We propose an optimization model, the ε\varepsilonε-greedy adversarial equilibrium, and show that it can serve as a computationally tractable alternative to the min-max optimization model. Roughly, we say that a point (x⋆,y⋆)(x^\star, y^\star)(x⋆,y⋆) is an ε\varepsilonε-greedy adversarial equilibrium if y⋆y^\stary⋆ is an ε\varepsilonε-approximate local maximum for f(x⋆,⋅)f(x^\star,\cdot)f(x⋆,⋅), and x⋆x^\starx⋆ is an ε\varepsilonε-approximate local minimum for a "greedy approximation" to the function max⁡zf(x,z)\max_z f(x, z)maxz​f(x,z) which can be efficiently estimated using second-order optimization algorithms. We prove the existence of such a point for any smooth function which is bounded and has Lipschitz Hessian. To prove existence, we introduce an algorithm that converges from any starting point to an ε\varepsilonε-greedy adversarial equilibrium in a number of evaluations of the function fff, the max-player's gradient ∇yf(x,y)\nabla_y f(x,y)∇y​f(x,y), and its Hessian ∇y2f(x,y)\nabla^2_y f(x,y)∇y2​f(x,y), that is polynomial in the dimension ddd, 1/ε1/\varepsilon1/ε, and the bounds on fff and its Lipschitz constant.

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