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Lazy-CFR: fast and near optimal regret minimization for extensive games with imperfect information

10 October 2018
Yichi Zhou
Tongzheng Ren
J. Li
Dong Yan
Jun Zhu
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Abstract

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is the most popular algorithm on solving two-player zero-sum extensive games with imperfect information and achieves state-of-the-art performance in practice. However, the performance of CFR is not fully understood, since empirical results on the regret are much better than the upper bound proved in \cite{zinkevich2008regret}. Another issue is that CFR has to traverse the whole game tree in each round, which is time-consuming in large scale games. In this paper, we present a novel technique, lazy update, which can avoid traversing the whole game tree in CFR, as well as a novel analysis on the regret of CFR with lazy update. Our analysis can also be applied to the vanilla CFR, resulting in a much tighter regret bound than that in \cite{zinkevich2008regret}. Inspired by lazy update, we further present a novel CFR variant, named Lazy-CFR. Compared to traversing O(∣I∣)O(|\mathcal{I}|)O(∣I∣) information sets in vanilla CFR, Lazy-CFR needs only to traverse O(∣I∣)O(\sqrt{|\mathcal{I}|})O(∣I∣​) information sets per round while keeping the regret bound almost the same, where I\mathcal{I}I is the class of all information sets. As a result, Lazy-CFR shows better convergence result compared with vanilla CFR. Experimental results consistently show that Lazy-CFR outperforms the vanilla CFR significantly.

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