vVote: a Verifiable Voting System (DRAFT)

The Pr\^et \`a Voter cryptographic voting system was designed to be flexible and to offer voters a familiar and easy voting experience. In this paper we present a case study of our efforts to adapt Pr\^et \`a Voter to the idiosyncrasies of elections in the Australian state of Victoria. This technical report includes general background, user experience and details of the cryptographic protocols and human processes. We explain the problems, present solutions, then analyse their security properties and explain how they tie in to other design decisions. We hope this will be an interesting case study on the application of end-to-end verifiable voting protocols to real elections. This is the 10th February 2014 version of "Draft Technical Report for VEC vVote System". We now place this version on the record, following the external review of the VEC vVote system. The team involved in developing the vVote design described in this report were: Craig Burton, Chris Culnane, James Heather, Rui Joaquim, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Steve Schneider and Vanessa Teague.